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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate whether greater microeconomic flexibility facilitates the process of creative 
destruction in the context of new trade models with heterogeneous firms (Bernard et al., 2003 and 
Melitz, 2003). In these models, freer trade increases aggregate productivity because high-efficiency 
plants expand through exporting and low-efficiency plants exit the market. However, factor 
reallocation could be negatively affected by the presence of microeconomic frictions. We use these 
insights of the theory to analyze whether a reduction in trade costs increases the probability of 
becoming an exporter relatively more in industries with greater microeconomic flexibility and 
whether plant exit driven by trade costs declines is more likely in industries with lower frictions. 
Using plant level data from Venezuela, we report results supporting these predictions. 
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It is increasingly recognized that the process of creative destruction is one of the core components 
of economic development. Popularized by Schumpter, the notion that innovative entry is the force 
that sustain long-term economic growth even as it renders obsolete and consequentially destroys 
value of established processes, products or firms, has not only been formalized many times in the 
profession (see e.g. Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos, 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992) but has 
also found strong support in the empirical literature. Plant level studies, for example, increasingly 
show that an important share of aggregate productivity growth, in both developed and developing 
countries, arises by the reallocation of resources from low to high productivity plants (see e.g., 
Bernard and Jensen, 1999, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krisan, 1998 and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and 
Scarpetta, 2004). This highlights the role of creative destruction on productivity growth. 
 
New trade models with heterogeneous firms (Bernard et al., 2003 and Melitz, 2003) suggest 
that international trade play a significant role in this reallocative process across firms. Indeed, 
consistent empirical evidence supporting these trade-induced reallocation channels has been found 
in Bernard et al., (2006), Blyde, Iberti and Moreira (2009) and Eslava et al., (2009). However, there is 
relatively less investigation on how the presence of microeconomic frictions affects this trade-
induced reallocative process. This paper is a contribution to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
We use the predictions of the new trade models with heterogeneous firms to explore the 
workings of creative destruction in the presence of microeconomic rigidities. In these new models, 
trade raises the economy’s average productivity by weeding out the low and boosting the high 
productivity firms. Therefore, we test whether a reduction in trade costs increases the probability of 
becoming an exporter relatively more in industries with lower microeconomic frictions, and whether 
falling trade costs raises the prospects of plant exit relatively more in more flexible industries.  
 
Our analysis contributes to three literatures. First, we examine specific channels by which 
microeconomic distortions affect the reallocation of resources across firms of different productivity 
levels. This is associated with a recent surge of studies indicating that the presence of distortions 
account for large differences between developed and developing countries in the efficiency of 
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resource allocation across heterogeneous firms (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 
2008 and Alfaro et. al., 2008). By testing various mechanisms of factor reallocation and their 
frictions, our paper provides concrete examples to this literature regarding some of the channels by 
which distortions affect an efficient allocation of resources across plants.  
 
Second, our results highlight the limited role of trade in boosting aggregate productivity in 
economies that are highly distorted with microeconomic frictions. A large cross-country empirical 
literature has examined the effects of trade on economic performance. While many studies have 
found that trade have positive effects on income (Dollar, 1992; Ben David, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 
1995; Frankel and Romer, 1999 and Wacziarg and Welch, 2003) others have casted doubts about the 
robustness of these aggregate results (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001, and Rodrik et al. 2004). A more 
recent literature (Freund and Bolaky, 2008 and Kambourov, 2009) contributes to clarify some of the 
controversy by showing that there is a positive relationship between trade and income per-capita in 
flexible economies, but not in economies that are highly distorted with regulations. This work is 
important because it highlights the potential limits of trade openness in boosting income in 
economies with various types of frictions. Our work advances this discussion even further by 
showing some of the specific channels by which microeconomic frictions interfere with the capacity 
of trade to enhance economic performance.  
 
Finally, our research contributes to a more general literature of creative destruction and its 
impediments. Several factors, from constrained contracting ability in labor markets to 
underdeveloped financial markets, have been suggested to slow down the required reallocation and 
restructuring inherent of creative destruction processes (see e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 1994, 
Caballero and Hammour, 2000). However, empirical evidence not only on the role of these and 
other microeconomic frictions in hampering creative destruction but also on the channels through 
which these distortions operate is still relatively scarce. In the context of this paper, the notion of 
creative destruction is related to the prediction that the most efficient plants are likely to expand 
through exporting when trade costs are reduced and the less efficient plants are likely to exit the 
market as a result. By analyzing the extent to which this process is hampered by microeconomic 
frictions, the paper helps to understand why some processes of creative destruction might never take 
place. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the reallocation effects 
predicted by the new trade models with heterogeneous firms and explains how the predictions can 
be used to analyze the impact of microeconomic rigidities on the process of creative destruction. 
Section 3 describes the various datasets used in the analysis. The empirical results are also presented 
in this section. Section 4 concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical Background 
 
A large empirical literature using microeconomic data have found a positive correlation between 
international trade and the productivity of the plant, although the evidence is still mixed regarding 
the causality of this relationship (see e.g. Aw, Chung, and Roberts, 2000; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; 
Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998; Harrison, 1994; Pavcnik, 2002; Alvarez 
and Lopez, 2005; and Fernandes, 2007). Much less controversial, however, is the role that 
international trade plays in boosting aggregate productivity by reallocating resources from low to 
high efficiency plants. An increasing body of evidence indicates that a large share of aggregate 
productivity growth arises from the reallocation of resources from low to high productivity plants 
(see e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and Bartelsman, et. al., 2004) and new trade models with 
heterogeneous firms indeed suggest that international trade plays an important role in this 
reallocative process (Bernard et al., 2003 and Melitz, 2003). Consistent empirical evidence 
supporting these trade-induced reallocation channels has been found in Bernard et al., (2006), Blyde, 
Iberti and Moreira (2009) and Eslava et al., (2009). 
 
These new trade models with heterogeneous firms provide an excellent framework to 
investigate the process of creative destruction and its obstacles because they lay out the specific 
mechanisms by which trade weeds out the low productivity and boost the high productivity firms. In 
this section we present a brief summary of one of these models, the Melit’z model, in order to 
highlight the theoretical predictions that guide our empirical analysis. 
 
The trade model in Melitz (2003) is characterized by monopolistic competition in which 
each variety is produced by a single firm, and there is free entry into the industry. All firms use the 
same technology represented by a cost function with constant marginal costs and a fixed production 
cost, but firms are heterogeneous in terms of their intrinsic productivity. The model assumes the 
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existence of an unbounded pool of prospective entrants into the industry. To enter the industry, 
firms must make an initial investment, or fixed entry cost, and only afterwards they learn about their 
productivity. The firm will produce if profits are positive, otherwise it will exit immediately. 
 
Trade is costly in the sense that to export a manufacturing variety to a particular market, a 
firm must incur in a fixed export cost which is different (and additional) to the fixed cost of 
production. The firm also faces variable trade costs, which take the standard iceberg formulation. 
These fixed and variable trade costs mean that, depending on their productivity, some firms may 
choose not to export in equilibrium. Specifically, the less productive firms will produce exclusively 
for the domestic market and only the most productive firms will be able to export. 
 
In this model, a reduction in trade costs induces a reallocation of resources from low to high 
productivity plants. The reallocative process associated to creative-destruction works as follows: 
falling trade costs implies greater profits for the exporters which induce more entry. Specifically, 
lower trade costs reduce the productivity threshold for exporting which increases the number of 
firms which export. The new exporters are drawn from the most productive non-exporters firms 
and from the new entrants. The expansion of the more productive firms through exporting raises 
the demand for domestic inputs. As a result, domestic producers are hit by competition from 
foreign exporters, on the one hand, and by higher input prices on the other, which forces the least 
productive of these firms to exit the market. This completes the process of creative destruction. In 
summary, aggregate productivity gains occur because the most productive non-exporters begin to 
export when trade costs decline and the low productivity establishments exit the market as a result. 
 
The workings of this model provide an excellent framework to test the specific channels by 
which microeconomic frictions deter a process of creative destruction induced, in this case, by 
international trade. Before getting into the details on how we do this, it is worth saying a few words 
about what we mean by microeconomic frictions. Generically, we define microeconomic frictions as 
all the bureaucratic, legal and institutional hurdles that increase the costs of opening and operating a 
business. These frictions could arise form government policies and regulations or from government 
deficiencies or red tape. For example, excessive bureaucratic procedures required to start or to close 
a business, to register property, to acquire a business license or to obtain construction or operating 
permits can all increase the costs of doing business. Similarly, stringent labor market regulations can 
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make more difficult and costly the process of hiring and firing workers which in turn increases the 
adjustment costs of operating a firm. Equally, weak institutional environments can increase the costs 
of enforcing contracts by raising the time and the number of procedures that a firm must incur from 
filing a lawsuit to actual payment. All these are examples of microeconomic rigidities that can 
increase the costs of running a business.  
 
In the context of the theoretical discussion presented above, a firm facing all these costs 
must draw a high level of productivity in order to earn sufficient revenues to cover them and satisfy 
the zero-profit productivity cutoff. This implies that in industries with large microeconomic 
rigidities, only firms with very high productivity draws will be able to produce profitably and become 
exporters. On the contrary, in industries with low microeconomic frictions, the much lower zero-
profit productivity cutoff means that the chances that a prospective firm will be able to produce and 
potentially become an exporter are higher. This feature provides the basis for our inference strategy 
in the context of the main insights of Melitz’s model. In particular, the predictions of the model that 
we want to test are: i) a decrease in variable trade costs increases the probability of becoming an 
exporter relatively more in industries with lower microeconomic frictions, and ii) a decrease in 
variable trade costs raises the probability of firm exit relatively more in industries with lower 
microeconomic rigidities. The next section describes an empirical model to test these predictions. 
  
III. Empirical Analysis 
 
III.1 Model Specification 
 
The previous section suggests that the market selection effects of trade reductions are larger in 
industries with lower microeconomic frictions. Based on this implication, our empirical approach is 
to test for a differential effect of changes in trade costs in industries that are more flexible. We 
estimate two models to analyze the two predictions stated above: one model for the probability of 
becoming an exporter and another model for the probability that a plant exit the market. 
 
We use the following probit model to analyze the impact of falling trade costs on the 
probability that a non-exporting plant becomes an exporter: 
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where 1+ijts  takes the value of 1 if plant i in industry j is a non-exporter in period t and becomes an 
exporter in period t+1; 1−Δ jtTar  is the change in the tariff rate in industry j between t-1 and t; ijtX  is 
a vector of plant characteristics, jF  is a measure of microeconomic frictions in industry j and jα , tα  
and rα  are industry, time and region effects respectively. Finally, the interaction term between the 
tariff rate and the measure of microeconomic frictions allows us to assess whether the effect of 
changes in trade costs on the probability of exporting is less significant in more rigid industries. 
 
Equivalently, we use the following probit model to analyze the impact of falling trade costs 
on the probability of plant exit: 
 
)()Pr( 111 rtjjjtjitjtijt FTarXTare αααϕγβφ +++Δ++Δ= −−+    (2) 
 
where 1+jite  takes the value of 1 if plant i in industry j exits between periods t and t+1, and the rest of 
the variables are described as before. We estimate these models using plant level data from 
Venezuela.  
 
III.2 Data 
 
We use a panel of manufacturing plants drawn from the Venezuelan Industrial Survey 
(Encuesta Industrial de Venezuela). This is an annual survey of manufacturing conducted by the 
Venezuelan Statistics Agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). The survey covers 
manufacturing plants that employ at least five individuals and collects detailed information on plant 
characteristics, such as geographic location, manufacturing industry, production, value added, 
exports, employment, intermediate inputs, and investment. Capital stocks are constructed using the 
perpetual inventory method for each plant. A measure of total factor productivity is constructed 
using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology. 
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Given the dynamic nature of the creative destruction process, we are interested in covering 
the longest time period possible. The available data spans from 1995 to 2004. The survey is 
conducted using a stratified random sample procedure with 828 strata corresponding to 4 
occupational categories, 23 estates and 9 economic activities (ISIC revision 2 at 2 digits). Only the 
largest occupation category -that is plants with more than 100 employees- is treated like a census 
during this entire period of analysis. This implies that only the plant exits that are recorded in this 
occupational category represent “true” exits of the market and not the result of the random 
sampling process. Accordingly, we use only the plants in this occupational category which provides 
us with a panel of 6,431 observations. Table 1 shows a summary statistics of the main variables used 
from this survey. 
 
Measuring microeconomic flexibility is a challenging exercise. One way is to look directly at 
regulations. For example, we could examine whether there are differences in labor regulations across 
industries and construct an index of labor regulation at the industry level similar to those that have 
been constructed at the country level (see e.g. Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 2004 and Heckman and Pagés, 2004). The problem with this approach, however, is that 
microeconomic flexibility depends not only on labor regulations but also on an array of many other 
factors, as mentioned before. Constructing various indices to provide a “big picture” of all these 
factors would be a formidable task, to say the least. Instead, we take a different route and construct a 
general measure of microeconomic flexibility following the methodology developed by Caballero, 
Engel and Micco (2004) (CEM henceforth). 
 
The main idea behind this methodology is that a general degree of microeconomic flexibility 
can be captured by the speed at which establishments reduce the gap between their labor 
productivity and the marginal costs of such labor. According to the authors, an economy or industry 
is inflexible at the microeconomic level if these gaps persist over time. Conversely, a very flexible 
economy or industry, is one in which gaps disappear quickly because adjustments can be done 
promptly. 
 
According to the authors, the theoretical underpinning of such estimation is based on an 
adjustment hazard model, where the change in the number of jobs in plant i in industry j between t-1 
and t is a probabilistic function of the gap between desired and actual employment: 
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where 1−ijte  is the logarithm of employment of plant i in industry j at time t-1, 
*
ijte  is desired 
employment in period t, ijtψ  is assume to be i.i.d. both across establishments and over time, takes 
values between 0 and 1 and has mean λ  and variance )1( λαλ − , with 10 ≤≤α . The degree of 
microeconomic flexibility is captured by λ  which increases when λ  approaches one and falls when 
λ  declines. A key part of the calculation is to obtain good proxies for the desired level of 
employment. This is done employing observables like labor productivity and the average market 
wage (see CEM for details). The authors use firm-level data to estimate country-wide measures of 
microeconomic flexibility for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. They found, for 
example, that Chile exhibits the highest degree of microeconomic flexibility while Venezuela the 
lowest. 
 
While it is certainly useful to estimate an average country-wide measure of microeconomic 
flexibility, particularly to make comparisons across countries, the degree of microeconomic flexibility 
might not be necessarily the same across industries within the same country. For instance, the 
Venezuelan labor law establishes the right of workers and employers to negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements. These are agreements that are made between unions and employers and they 
normally establish several conditions for labor relations and the rights and obligations of the two 
sides. The collective bargaining agreements may cover everything from wages and fringe benefits to 
work rules, grievance procedures and the prerogative of union officials. While collective agreements 
can certainly be negotiated at the plant level, in Venezuela there is a general trend towards industry-
wide bargaining to set minimum conditions for all the plants in the industry. As union affiliation and 
its capacity to negotiate can vary markedly across industries, the outcome of these collective 
bargaining agreements are also be very different across industries. Similarly, there are industry 
variations in terms of investment approval or in obtaining business licenses. We exploit all this 
variation in the level of microeconomic frictions across industries in our empirical analysis. In 
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essence, we use the methodology presented in CEM but estimate a measure of microeconomic 
frictions that varies across industries.1  
 
Results are shown in Table 2. Microeconomic rigidity in Venezuela seems to vary greatly 
across industries from “footwear” (ISIC 324) exhibiting the lowest degree of frictions to “other 
chemicals” (ISIC 352) -with twice the degree of rigidity in footwear- showing the highest. Although 
the pattern is not uniform, a general trend is evident: the industries in the textile, wearing apparel 
and the leather sectors are the most flexible while the industries in the chemical and basic metal 
sectors are to be the most rigid.2 The situation on the ground seems to support these findings. For 
instance, in Venezuela, besides the standard registering requirements, firms seeking to operate in 
sectors like processing of metals, production of construction of materials, energy industries, and 
chemical industries must submit an environmental-impact study with specific obligations that vary 
depending on the sector. Also, Venezuelan governments have traditionally conferred strategic 
importance to certain industries including hydrocarbons, basic chemical and basic metal industries. 
Projects in those industries must normally get an approval by Congress and sometimes by the 
executive branch (EIU, 2008). Finally, while investments in areas like basic metal and the energy 
sector have been opened to private capital, the share of public capital is normally high. The 
participation of the state in these industries could act as a friction as it is more difficult, for instance, 
to adjust employment levels in times of recessions.  
 
The ad valorem tariff rates used in the probit models come from Nicita and Olarreaga 
(2006). The information refers to applied tariff rates which take into consideration preference 
schemes. The data is provided at the 3 digit ISIC revision 2 industry level, where the rate in industry 
j is the import weighted average across all products in j. Table 2 reports the information for three 
alternative years. The average tariff rate in Venezuela and its dispersion increased from 1995 to 2000, 
but declined since then. Between 2000 and 2005, the external protection rate fell in 21 out of 27 
industries.3 
                                                 
1 To emphasize the existence of microeconomic distortions, we present the index as a measure of microeconomic 
frictions rather than an index of microeconomic flexibility as presented by CEM. Therefore, our measure is equal to one 
over the index constructed as in CEM. 
2 We have excluded the petroleum refineries (ISIC 353) and the miscellaneous petroleum and coal products (ISIC 354) 
from the analysis because they are organized in a manner that is inconsistent with the underlying behavioral trade model; 
that is, they are organized as monopolies, are mostly state-owned and produce with very few plants. 
3 The theoretical models described above contemplate symmetric reductions in trade costs, i.e., both inbound and 
outbound trade costs change in the same way. The correlation between Venezuela’s inbound tariffs and its outbound 
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III.3 Empirical Results  
 
Before testing the predictions of the model stated above, we would like investigate whether 
firms that exit are in general less productive than firms that do not exit, and whether exporters are 
more productive than the non-exporters. This is shown in Table 3. Each row in the table reports 
results from a separate regression of the following form:  
 
itrtjiitit XLTFP εαααγβα ++++++=)ln(     (3) 
 
where the dependent variable is the TFP of plant; itL  is the plant's labor force (a proxy for size); iX  
is a dummy equal to 1 if the plant exit during the sample period (regression in row 1), if the plant is a 
non-exporter and eventually becomes an exporter (regression in row 2); and jα , tα  and rα  are 
industry, year and region fixed effects. The coefficients in the table report the estimated γˆ  for the 
two different regressions.  
 
The results in the first row indicate that after controlling for differences in size and industry 
characteristics, plants that exit are indeed less productive than plants that do not exit. Plants that exit 
are on average 18% less productive than plants that do not exit. The second row shows that non-
exporters that eventually become exporters are on average 38% more productive than the plants that 
never export. This is consistent with evidence in other countries. 4 
 
While not directly testing the effects of trade on resource allocation, these results provide 
some preliminary elements that are important for the creative destruction process to take place, 
namely that the plants that normally exit are on average less productive than the plants that do not 
exit and that the plants that eventually become exporters are usually more productive than the plants 
that do not export. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
tariffs (using Venezuela’s main trading partners) across the ISIC 3-digit industries and overtime is positive (0.80) and 
significant (1%) in levels and also positive (0.12) and significant (5%) in first differences. Therefore, in our econometric 
model we only use the inbound tariffs as our proxy for trade costs as this variable is already highly correlated with the 
outbound tariffs. This also gives us a more parsimonious empirical specification.  
4 See Alvarez and Lopez (2005) for the case of exporters in Chile. 
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III.4 New exporters 
 
We now investigate the role of microeconomic frictions in the potential reallocative effects 
of trade. We start with the estimation of equation 1 for the probability of becoming an exporter. 
Results are reported in Table 4. The first column focuses only on the tariff rate. The second column 
includes the plant’s productivity. According to the theory, the productivity of the plant should be 
positively associated with the probability of becoming an exporter. In column 3 we include 
additional plant controls that are assumed to be positively correlated with the probability of 
exporting: the plant’s size (using labor force as a proxy) and its capital intensity. Finally, in column 4 
we include the interaction term between the index of microeconomic frictions and the change in 
trade costs. The interaction explores whether the probability of becoming an exporter when trade 
costs fall is lower in industries with greater microeconomic frictions.  
 
Except for the labor force, the estimated coefficients for all the plant controls are positive 
and significant, as expected. The coefficient for the labor force is negative but is not statistically 
significant. Regarding the effect of the trade cost, the first three regressions show a lack of 
relationship between the change in the tariff rate and the probability of becoming an exporter. 
However, this result changes in column 4 after explicitly controlling for the role of microeconomic 
frictions. In this last regression the coefficient for the change in the tariff rate becomes negative and 
statistically significant and the coefficient for the interaction term between the change in the tariff 
rate and the friction index is positive and is also statistically significant. These two results imply that 
a reduction in trade costs increases the probability of becoming an exporter, but that the effect 
diminishes with the level of microeconomic frictions. In other words, the larger the microeconomic 
friction in an industry, the less likely that a firm in that industry will become an exporter when facing 
a reduction in trade costs. 
 
Figure 1 presents an illustration of this finding. Using the results from the regression in 
column 4, the figure is constructed as follows: first, we add the marginal effect of the change in the 
tariff rate with the marginal effect of the interaction term. This is done for each plant. This gives us 
the overall marginal effect of the change in the tariff rate on the probability of exporting for each 
plant. Then, we obtain the average marginal effect for each industry by taking the average of the 
marginal effects of all the plants in that industry.  
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The industries are sorted according to their friction index in a way that moving from left to 
right, the level of friction increases. What the figure shows is that, in general, the positive effect of 
the reduction in the tariff rate on the likelihood of exporting diminishes with the level of frictions. 
In other words, plants in industries with low microeconomic frictions tend to have a large 
probability of becoming an exporter when trade costs fall, but this likelihood decreases as frictions 
rise. In fact, as the frictions become very large, the probability of becoming an exporter turns 
negative, meaning that in industries with very large frictions, a smaller number of plants become 
exporters in the face of falling trade costs than the number of plants that are already servicing 
foreign markets and stop exporting. 
 
Going back to the regression results presented in column 4, another way to interpret the 
findings is to think about two forces that are pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, a 
reduction in the tariff rate increases the probability of servicing the export market. This force is 
captured in the regression by the negative (and statistically significant) coefficient of the tariff rate 
change. On the other hand, the level of friction diminishes the effect of the tariff reduction on the 
probability of becoming an exporter which is captured by the positive (and statistically significant) 
coefficient of the interaction term. The overall effect depends on the relative size of these two 
opposite effects. Note that the regression in column 3 does not control for the level of friction 
explicitly. Therefore, in this regression these two forces are captured by the coefficient of the tariff 
rate alone. As shown, the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. But it would be 
misleading to conclude from this regression that the reduction in trade costs does not have any 
effect on the probability of exporting. What regression 4 (and figure 1) is telling us is that a 
reduction in trade costs indeed has an effect on the probability of exporting as long as the level of 
microeconomic frictions is not too large. As the level of frictions increase this effect disappears.  
 
The result highlights the notion that the removal of trade costs by itself would not 
necessarily generate some of the expected effects from trade liberalization if other microeconomic 
distortions are not tackled as well. 
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III.5 Plant exit 
 
As mentioned in the theoretical background, the other side of this trade-induced creative 
destruction process is the exit of the inefficient plants when trade barriers are lowered. Table 5 
shows the result of estimating equation 2 with an increasing number of plant controls in each 
column. Consistent with the theory, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the changes in the tariff rate and the probability of exit. Also, the results show that the 
overall probability of exit decreases with the productivity of the plant.5 Finally, as shown in column 
4, the coefficient for the interaction term between the index of microeconomic frictions and the 
change in trade costs is positive and statistically significant, meaning that the probability of exit the 
market with a decline in the tariff rate is smaller in industries with large frictions, as expected.  
 
Figure 2 is equivalent to Figure 1 for the case of the probability of exit. Once again, the 
general trend is that the increase in the likelihood of exit from a cut in trade costs diminishes with 
the level of distortions. That is, the larger the microeconomic friction in the industry, the less likely 
that a firm in that industry will exit the market when is hit by a reduction in trade costs. 
 
The results on new exporters and on plant exit indicate that the trade-induced reallocation of 
resources across heterogeneous plants is contingent to the level of microeconomic rigidities. In 
highly distorted industries these trade-induced reallocation effects might only be marginal. The 
inspection of figures 1 and 2 also suggest that the negative effects of microeconomic frictions on the 
creative destruction process is more severe at the new exporters channel than at the plant exit 
channel (the chances of becoming an exporter given a decline in trade costs decrease very quickly as 
the level of friction rises while the chances of exit the market decrease less rapidly over the same 
range of frictions).  
 
III.6 Robustness Checks 
 
We re-estimate equations 1 and 2 with a number of modifications to check for the 
robustness of the results. Essentially, we eliminate extreme values in the covariates to make sure that 
the results have not been influenced by outliers. Table 6 shows the case for the probit model of 
                                                 
5 Plant exit is also negatively associated with the level of capital intensity but not with its size. 
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exporting. The estimation presented in column 1, for example, excludes all the plants in the 
industries with the highest and lowest values of the microeconomic friction index. The estimation in 
column 2 excludes all the plants in the industries with the highest and lowest changes in the tariff 
rate. The estimation in column 3 excludes all the plants below the bottom 10 percentile and above 
the top 90 percentile of productivity. While there are some minor changes in some of the 
coefficients, the estimations in all the three regressions indicate that the results do not change in any 
significant way. 
 
Similar robustness checks for the probit model on plant exit are presented in Table 7. Once 
again, while the values of some of the estimated coefficients do change slightly, the general 
qualitative results hold after all of these modifications. The evidence presented in Tables 6 and 7 
corroborates the results shown in Tables 4 and 5 that the market selection effects of trade are 
attenuated by the presence of microeconomic frictions. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
High trade costs tend to distort an efficient allocation of resources by protecting inefficient 
producers and by limiting the expansion of the efficient ones. A decline in trade costs, then, should 
promote a more efficient factor reallocation by increasing the likelihood that the inefficient 
producers exit the market and by allowing the efficient producers to grow through exporting. 
Microeconomic frictions, however, might prevent this trade-induced reallocative process to take 
place. This paper presents empirical evidence supporting this argument. Lowering trade costs 
increases the chances of becoming an exporter if the plant faces a flexible microeconomic 
environment, but the effect diminishes as the level of frictions increase. Likewise, it is more likely 
that cuts in trade costs drive inefficient producers out of the market in industries with low levels of 
frictions than in rigid industries. 
 
The results stress the notion that the removal of trade costs by itself would not necessarily 
generate many of the expected effects regarding an improved and select market of plants if other 
microeconomic frictions are not addressed as well.  
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Variable Mean Std Dev
Labor 5.37 0.82
Capital / Labor 6.81 1.40
Total Factor Productivity 6.26 1.19
Exit Rate 0.05 0.02
Entry to Export Rate 0.07 0.02
No of observations 6431
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations of the log of labor, the log of the capital-
labor ratio, the log of TFP, the exit rate and the entry into the export market rate. The exit rate is the 
number of plants that reported positive production in period t but not in period t+1 divided by the 
total number of plants in period t. The entry into the export market rate is the number of plants that 
reported positive exports in period t but not in period t-1 divided by the number of plants that do 
not export in period t.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
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1995 2000 2004
311 Food manufacturing 2.242 14.3 18.8 13.9
312 Prepared animal feeds & food products nec 1.919 14.1 18.6 13.7
313 Beverages 1.388 17.0 18.7 18.6
314 Tobacco 1.384 19.9 20.0 18.0
321 Textiles 1.327 11.5 17.8 16.2
322 Wearing, apparel 1.243 13.5 19.8 19.5
323 Leather products 1.412 9.1 17.4 16.0
324 Footwear 1.163 14.7 20.0 19.5
331 Wood products 1.640 8.7 13.9 13.6
332 Furniture 1.608 15.3 19.2 16.8
341 Paper and products 1.635 7.8 9.9 7.9
342 Printing and publishing 1.731 12.6 6.9 7.1
351 Industrial chemicals 1.669 8.8 7.8 7.1
352 Other chemicals 2.332 9.0 11.1 8.8
355 Rubber products 1.557 11.5 13.5 13.1
356 Plastic products 1.395 15.1 18.4 16.7
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 1.498 10.7 17.6 13.7
362 Glass and products 1.364 12.4 14.3 12.4
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 1.468 12.7 13.9 12.5
371 Iron and steel 1.667 10.9 11.9 9.5
372 Non-ferrous metals 1.806 5.1 9.8 6.0
381 Fabricated metal products 1.629 13.7 15.4 13.8
382 Machinery, except electrical 1.435 10.9 9.2 8.7
383 Machinery, electric 1.676 13.8 10.6 9.1
384 Transport equipment 1.642 16.1 24.6 21.0
385 Professional and scientific equipment 1.744 11.9 7.9 7.4
390 Other manufactured products 1.615 17.0 17.9 14.7
1.60 12.5 15.0 13.2
3.3 3.3 4.8 4.5
Average
Standard deviation
Microeconomic 
frictions index
Table 2: Microeconomic frictions index and ad valorem tariffs by three-digit ISIC industry
Industry Tariffs (%)
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Plants that exit / plants do not exit -0.180***
(0.0373)
New exporters / Non-exporters 0.376***
(0.0346)
Table 3: Average plant TFP relative to comparator group
Notes: Plant-level regression results. Dependent variable is the plant's TFP. Regressors include the plant's size (Labor), 
year, industry and location fixed effects, and a dummy equal to 1 if the plant exit during the sample period (regression 
in row 1) or if the plant is a non-exporter and eventually becomes an exporter (regression in row 2). Coefficients in the 
table report results for this dummy variable on the two different regressions
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively  
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Table 4: Probability of entering the export market 
Regressor Probit   Probit   Probit   Probit 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Change in tariff  0.0146  0.0071  0.0042  -0.1874** 
  (0.0269)  (0.0268)  (0.0262)  (0.0916) 
 Productivity    0.0071***  0.0056**  0.0055** 
    (0.0025)  (0.0025)  (0.0026) 
 Labor      -0.0013  -0.0011 
     (0.0041)  (0.0042) 
 Capital / Labor      0.0094***  0.0094*** 
     (0.0019)  (0.0019) 
 Change in tariff  x  friction index        0.1111** 
       (0.0502) 
         
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  5403  5306  5306  5306 
Pseudo R2   0.04   0.04   0.05   0.05 
Notes: Plant-level probit regression results. Numbers are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the three-digit ISIC 
level in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are also at the three-digit ISIC level. Dependent variable indicates whether a non-exporting plant in year t 
becomes an exporter in year t+1. First regressor is the change in the tariff rate between t-1 and t. Next three regressors are plant controls for year t where 
productivity, labor and capital/labor are the plant's TFP, its total labor force and the capital labor ratio respectively. All plant controls are in logs. Last 
regressor is the interaction between the change in the tariff rate and the microeconomic frictions index.  
***; **; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 5: Probability of exit 
Regressor Probit   Probit   Probit   Probit 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Change in tariff  0.1104***  0.1044***  0.1034***  -0.4255** 
  (0.0399)  (0.0381)  (0.0384)  (0.1855) 
 Productivity    0.0132***  0.0127***  -0.0127*** 
    (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0033) 
 Labor      -0.0012  -0.0011 
     (0.0038)  (0.0038) 
 Capital / Labor      -0.0056**  -0.0057** 
     (0.0022)  (0.0022) 
 Change in tariff  x  friction index        0.1874* 
       (0.1111) 
         
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4826  4750  4750  4750 
Pseudo R2   0.08   0.09   0.09   0.09 
Notes: Plant-level probit regression results. Numbers are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the three-digit ISIC 
level in parentheses. Industry fixed effects are also at the three-digit ISIC level. Dependent variable indicates plant exit between years t and t+1. First 
regressor is the change in the tariff rate between t-1 and t. Next three regressors are plant controls for year t where productivity, labor and capital/labor 
are the plant's TFP, its total labor force and the capital labor ratio respectively. All plant controls are in logs. Last regressor is the interaction between the 
change in the tariff rate and the microeconomic frictions index. 
***; **; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 6: Robustness checks, probability of entering the export market 
Regressor 
Plants in industries 
with highest and lowest 
friction indices 
excluded 
  
Plants in industries 
with highest and lowest 
changes in tariffs 
excluded 
  
Plants below bottom 10 
percentile and above 
top 90 percentile in TFP 
excluded 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Change in tariff  -0.2151**  -0.2109**  -0.2302** 
  (0.0943)  (0.1015)  (0.1026) 
 Productivity  0.0038  0.0046*  0.0021 
  (0.0024)  (0.0026)  (0.0040) 
 Labor  -0.0014  -0.0017  -0.0039 
 (0.0046)  (0.0044)  (0.0048) 
 Capital / Labor  0.0094***  0.0101***  0.0096*** 
 (0.0021)  (0.0019)  (0.0023) 
 Change in tariff  x  friction index  0.1277**  0.1209**  0.1459*** 
 (0.0506)  (0.0554)  (0.0546) 
       
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4700  5032  4181 
Pseudo R2   0.06   0.05   0.06 
Notes: Regression in column 1 excludes all the plants in the industries with the highest and lowest values in the microeconomic frictions index. Regression in column 2 excludes all the 
plants in the industries with the highest and lowest changes in the tariff rate. Regression in column 3 excludes the plants below the bottom 10 percentile and above the top 90 percentile 
of productivity. Numbers are marginal effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the three-digit ISIC level in parentheses 
***; **; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 7: Robustness checks, probability of exit 
Regressor 
Plants in industries 
with highest and lowest 
friction indices 
excluded 
  
Plants in industries 
with highest and lowest 
changes in tariffs 
excluded 
  
Plants below bottom 10 
percentile and above 
top 90 percentile in TFP 
excluded 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Change in tariff  -0.3028**  -0.3925**  -0.5324*** 
  (0.1485)  (0.1918)  (0.1652) 
 Productivity  -0.0131***  -0.0132***  -0.0167** 
  (0.0038)  (0.0034)  (0.0066) 
 Labor  -0.0031  -0.0010  0.0003 
 (0.0038)  (0.0039)  (0.0043) 
 Capital / Labor  -0.0040*  -0.0065**  -0.0010 
 (0.0022)  (0.0022)  (0.0032) 
 Change in tariff  x  friction index  0.1146  0.2039*  0.2519** 
 (0.0892)  (0.1235)  (0.1005) 
       
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4209  4508  3692 
Pseudo R2   0.1026   0.09   0.09 
Notes: Regression in column 1 excludes all the plants in the industries with the highest and lowest values in the microeconomic frictions index. Regression in column 2 excludes all the 
plants in the industries with the highest and lowest changes in the tariff rate. Regression in column 3 excludes the plants below the bottom 10 percentile and above the top 90 percentile 
of productivity. Numbers are marginal effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the three-digit ISIC level in parentheses 
***; **; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Figure 1: Average marginal effect of a reduction in the tariff rate on the 
probability of exporting at different levels of microeconomic frictions
Note: the figure shows the average marinal effect per industry calculated as the average of the marginal 
effects of all the plants in that industry. The marginal effects are obtained  from the estimated probit model 
in Table 5, column 4. See text for details regarding the microeconomic frictions index.
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Microeconomic frictions index
Figure 2: Average marginal effect of a reduction in the tariff rate on the 
probability of exit at different levels of microeconomic frictions
Note: the figure shows the average marinal effect per industry calculated as the average of the marginal 
effects of all the plants in that industry. The marginal effects are obtained  from the estimated probit model 
in Table 6, column 4. See text for details regarding the microeconomic frictions index.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
